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POLICY CHALLENGE
Trade links between southern Mediterranean countries (SMCs) are very lim-
ited and they trade mainly with the European Union. Energy represents more
than half of SMC exports to the EU. While the regional energy relationships
were developed on a bilateral basis, the EU’s Mediterranean energy policy has
followed a regional approach, aimed at harmonising energy policies and reg-
ulatory frameworks in the region on the path to a Euro-Mediterranean energy
market. This approach has proved unproductive and should change. The EU
should pursue bilateral energy policies through public-private partnerships
involving the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),  EU
companies and selected SMCs.
This would allow support to be
provided for sustainable
energy in partner countries,
improving their economic sta-
bility and safeguarding the EU’s
gas security of supply. It might
also represent a business
opportunity for EU energy firms
in the context of the sluggish
EU energy outlook.
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Sustainable energy funds for SMCs
THE ISSUE Political instability in the southern Mediterranean countries has
highlighted the unsustainability of their economic models. Widespread eco-
nomic discontent, and in particular very high youth unemployment,
underpinned the Arab Spring uprisings. As the refugee crisis shows, this is also
Europe’s problem and Euro-Mediterranean economic cooperation needs to be
reviewed. Energy is a key part of the cooperation framework.
Source: Bruegel
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1. In the European
Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP), the category
'Southern Neighbour-
hood' includes ten
partner countries:
Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt,
Israel, Palestinian
Territories, Jordan,
Lebanon and Syria.
Being an EU candidate
country, Turkey is not
included in this cate-
gory. This Policy Brief
focuses exclusively on
the Southern Neigh-
bourhood as defined by
the ENP. For an insight
into the EU-Turkey
energy relationship,
see Tagliapietra and
Zachmann (2015).
2. The UfM is a multilat-
eral partnership,
created in 2008, of 44
countries: 28 EU
member states and 16
Mediterranean and
Balkan partner
countries. The UfM
represents the
southern regional coop-
eration branch of the
ENP and  has the aim of
promoting stability
and prosperity
throughout the
Mediterranean region.
3. European
Commission and High
Representative of
the Union for Foreign
Policy and Security
Affairs (2015).
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN ENERGY
COOPERATION is on the Euro-
pean Union’s agenda in the
context of creating an EU Energy
Union and of revising the EU
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)1.
While until 2014 the EU’s rela-
tionship with the southern
Mediterranean countries (SMCs)
was mainly seen as an issue for
France, Italy and Spain (and to
some extent the United King-
dom), the migration crisis and
energy security concerns during
the Ukraine crisis have under-
lined that developments in SMCs
are relevant for the EU as a
whole. Defining the strategy at
EU level is logical because the
interests of member states are
quite well aligned and they will
achieve significant economic
and political leverage if they act
together. An aim of EU energy
policy is "to develop access to
alternative gas suppliers, includ-
ing [...] from the Mediterranean"
(European Commission, 2015).
The intention is to reduce the
reliance on existing suppliers. In
terms of foreign and neighbour-
hood policy, the EU’s primary
objective is to stabilise the
region in order to reduce the
migration pressure and reverse
the spread of radical Islam. 
Despite the significant changes
that have taken place in the
southern Mediterranean, the EU
has been slow to adapt its
energy and neighbourhood
policies. The EU’s policies
towards the region continue to be
grounded on a multilateral
approach, underpinned by the
vision of integrating the regional
energy markets into a sort
of unique Euro-Mediterranean
energy community. 
The multilateral approach is high-
lighted in the intergovernmental
Union for the Mediterranean
(UfM) initiative2. The High Repre-
sentative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs stressed in 2015 that the
role of the UfM should be
enhanced for "supporting coop-
eration between southern
neighbours"3. Accordingly, it was
decided in 20154 to create three
energy cooperation platforms:
the UfM Gas Platform, UfM
Regional Electricity Market Plat-
form5 and the UfM Renewable
Energy and Energy Efficiency
Platform6 (which will start up dur-
ing 2016). The aim of these
platforms is to facilitate "partner-
ships based on mutual trust and
transparency between UfM
member states as well as with
the relevant energy stakeholders
in the region"7.
Even though increased regional
energy cooperation certainly has
economic and political merits,
the prospects for these new ini-
tiatives are at best limited, for at
least five reasons:
Real energy cooperation in•
the region has always been,
and continues to be, bilat-
eral rather than multilateral
or regional8.
Previously tried regional•
energy initiatives did not
deliver.
The level of intra-regional•
trade in the southern
Mediterranean is among the
lowest in the world (Figure
1). This not because of a lack
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Figure 1: The EU’s predominant position in Euro-Mediterranean trade
Source: Bruegel based on UN Comtrade and Eurostat databases (accessed March 2016).
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4. For the sake of preci-
sion, it should be
mentioned that the ini-
tial decision to
establish the three the-
matic platforms was
taken on 19 November
2014 at the Rome High
Level Conference of
energy ministers on
'Building a Euro-
Mediterranean energy
bridge: the strategic
importance of Euro-Med
gas and electricity net-
works in the content of
energy security'.
5. Launched 11 June
2015 in Brussels. 
6. Launched 12 October
2015 in Rabat.
7. http://ufmsecre-
tariat.org/fostering-regi
onal-dialogue-on-
energy-launch-of-3-ufm
-platforms-on-gas-
regional-electricity-mar
kets-and-renewable-
energy-and-energy-effi
ciency/.
8. This is true for all
forms of economic rela-
tionship; see
Zachmann, Tam and
Granelli (2012).
of economic complementar-
ity, but rather because of a
lack of political trust among
the SMCs.
The geopolitical situation•
has massively deteriorated
in recent years, further limit-
ing the potential for regional
cooperation.
The EU viewed energy coop-•
eration as a core pillar of its
neighbourhood policy that
‘offered’ individual SMCs a
complex policy package
to increase cooperation. The
whole package was per-
ceived by the SMCs as
‘second class membership’
– and the SMCs thus never
took ownership of the entire
approach.
In this context, the EU should
rethink its energy policy towards
the southern Mediterranean,
particularly on renewable energy
and energy efficiency, for at least
two reasons:
Political stability in the south-•
ern Mediterranean is of
paramount important for the
EU, and in the longer term,
there is no political stability
without economic develop-
ment. But the economic
development of the region is
jeopardised by unsustain-
able energy sectors,
characterised by growing
demand and rising costs at a
time when investment and
production are declining.
Energy in the SMCs is a•
challenge, but also a great
opportunity. Energy demand
in the region is growing
strongly and there is also
significant energy production
potential. This represents a
business opportunity for
European energy companies,
and should be particularly
welcome given the sluggish
energy outlook within
Europe. Supporting the sus-
tainable energy transition in
SMCs might thus also be an
avenue for the European
energy industry to expand
into an emerging market that
is also on the radar of others,
such as China and Russia.
The expansion opportunity
should be welcomed by
European electric utilities,
companies specialised in
manufacturing renewable
energy and energy effi-
ciency solutions and also by
European oil and gas compa-
nies that are willing to
diversify their portfolios in
the framework of the
broader global energy tran-
sition. Furthermore, the
SMCs could be a stepping
stone to engage in other
parts of Africa, where there is
also a growing need for reli-
able and clean energy.
A REGIONAL POLICY APPROACH...
WITHOUT A REGION?
The Euro-Mediterranean energy
relationship dates back to the
1970s, when work started on the
first large-scale energy infra-
structure project – a gas pipeline
connecting Algeria to Italy
via Tunisia. Since then, more
than 7,000 kilometres of gas
pipelines have been laid across
the region, to connect Algeria
LOW (<20%)
MEDIUM (20%,65%)
HIGH (>65%*)
LOW (<100)
MEDIUM (100,500)
HIGH (>500)
GAS FLOWS
% of impor ts over 
consumption (2014)  
ELECTRICITY FLOWS
GWh per year (2014)
*Where >100% due to re-expor ts       
Figure 2: Euro-Mediterranean energy relationships: bilateral and fragmented
Source: Bruegel based on MEDREG (2015) and Eurostat (accessed March 2016).
br
ue
ge
lp
ol
ic
yb
ri
ef
04
ENERGY ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN:  A CALL FOR REALISM
with Spain and Italy, Libya with
Italy, and Egypt with Israel,
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.
Large-scale oil and liquefied nat-
ural gas (LNG) infrastructure has
been constructed all around the
Mediterranean, as have some
electricity interconnections. Suc-
cessful projects, especially in
the gas sector, have been built
on bilateral state-to-state and
company-to-company relation-
ships between producers in the
SMCs and importers in the north.
The Euro-Mediterranean energy
relationship has never switched
from this bilateral approach to a
more regional approach (Figure
2), although some large-scale
regional energy projects have
been attempted over the last two
decades, particularly in the
renewable energy sector. 
In 2003 the Trans-Mediterranean
Renewable Energy Cooperation
(TREC) initiative9 was started,
with the aim of unlocking the
renewable energy potential of
the region through cooperation
"as if there were no borders"10.
Between 2007 and 2009, this
initiative evolved into the
Desertec project, which was
specifically focused on tapping
into the potential of North African
and Middle Eastern deserts to
supply clean power (solar and
wind) to those regions and to
Europe. Desertec was politically
backed by the EU11, and also
gathered support from European
companies and banks. However,
Desertec failed to deliver. By
2014, 47 of the 50 initial
Desertec shareholders had left
the consortium, de facto marking
the end of the project.
The Mediterranean Solar Plan
(MSP) initiative suffered the
same fate. Started in 2008 as a
UfM flagship initiative, this proj-
ect also aimed to export solar
and wind power to Europe. The
MSP was supported by the Euro-
pean Commission, which also
promoted cooperation between
this project and Desertec. In
2013, the UfM secretariat elabo-
rated a new MSP master plan .
However, the UfM energy minis-
ters ultimately did not endorse
the master plan, de facto dissolv-
ing the MSP project13.
Desertec and the MSP both failed
because of lack of realism. On
the commercial side, the busi-
ness model based on the export
to the EU of solar and wind elec-
tricity produced in SMCs was
simply not viable because of:
i) high electricity generation
costs; ii) lack of electricity inter-
connections between SMCs and
between the northern and south-
ern Mediterranean shores; and
iii) the lack of a clear need on the
EU side for additional renewable
energy capacity. Politically,
both initiatives proved unrealis-
tic because they sought to take
an unviable one-size-fits-all
approach in the region, and
because they did not properly
take into account the essential
priority for the SMCs: to ensure
they could meet their own future
energy demand, not the EU’s.
On top of these weaknesses,
the combined effect of the eco-
nomic crisis and of the uprisings
in Arab countries delivered the
coup de grace to the projects14.
A key pillar of the EU’s energy
policy in the neighbourhood was
to promote the take-up of EU
energy policy principles, in par-
ticular liberalisation, and EU
energy legislation. In the Balkans
and eastern Europe, participation
in the Energy Community com-
9. See
http://www.e5.org/coop
erations-spin-offs/trec/.
10. United Nations
Environment
Programme (2007),
p 76.
11. For instance, see
Oettinger (2010).
12. See
http://ufmsecretariat.or
g/mediterranean-solar-
plan-master-plan-meeti
ng-with-the-minister-of-
energy-and-mineral-res
ources-of-jordan/.
13. For a detailed
discussion of this
evolution, see
Vantaggiato (2015).
14. See Escribano,
2015 
Figure 3: EU grants to energy projects and export of solar and wind
technologies to SMCs
Source: Bruegel based on European Investment Bank and UN Comtrade database
(accessed March 2016). Note: FEMIP = Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment
and Partnership; NIF = Neighborhood Investment Facility.
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tices, the implications have been
limited. It is thus time to question
whether the export of EU energy
rules to the SMCs serves the pur-
poses of either side.
Also from a wider perspective the
regionalist approach had no con-
crete impact on the evolution of
energy cooperation in the region.
The history of EU grants to
energy projects in SMCs and EU
exports of solar and wind tech-
nologies to SMCs (Figure 3)
indicates the lack of concrete
impact in the context of either
ENP or the UfM.
While the regional approach did
not deliver in the past, it has
become close to impossible
today. The civil war in Syria, the
implosion of Libya, the contro-
versial political situation in
Egypt, the uncertain political out-
look in Algeria and rise of radical
Islam indicate an increasing
level of geopolitical fragmenta-
tion on the southern shore of the
Mediterranean. A homogeneous
region does not exist.
BACK TO BASICS: WHAT AIMS FOR
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN ENERGY
COOPERATION? 
How could the Euro-Mediter-
ranean energy relationship
be better structured? Structuring
cooperation starts with identify-
ing common goals. We identify
three main aims for Euro-Mediter-
ranean energy cooperation:
Supporting the SMCs in•
meeting their energy chal-
lenges for the stake of
stability and growth;
Supporting a transition to•
sustainable energy in SMCs
for climate change mitigation
and also for macroeconomic
sustainability;
Ensuring the sustainability•
of current gas exports from
SMCs to the EU.
First, it should be noted that the
key energy challenge for SMCs
will be to meet their own rapidly
growing energy demand in a
secure and competitive way. As
Figure 4 shows, the total final
mitted countries to adopt the
acquis communitaire into their
national energy legislation. This
was supposed to create a stable
legal environment, which would
be conducive to the much-
needed private investment. The
partner countries also used their
Energy Community membership
as a signal that they are inter-
ested in EU accession. Without a
prospect of accession, SMCs
were not asked for, and did not
offer, full harmonisation with EU
energy rules. Nevertheless, the
Action Plans that are a backbone
of European Neighbourhood Pol-
icy foresee gradual convergence
towards European rules. In 2003,
for example, a ‘Memorandum of
Understanding for the progres-
sive integration of electricity
markets of Algeria, Morocco and
Tunisia and in the EU electricity
internal market’ was signed15.
The creation of Mediterranean
associations of regulators16 and
transmission system operators17
in 2007 and 2012 also some-
what followed the blueprint of EU
internal market integration. But,
apart from sharing best prac-
15.
http://www.eumonitor.e
u/9353000/1/j4nvgs5k
jg27kof_j9vvik7m1c3gy
xp/vi7jgswlayzs/f=/157
67_03.pdf.
16. http://www.medreg-
regulators.org/.
17. http://www.med-
tso.com/
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Figure 4: Total final energy consumption in SMCs and international comparison of average growth rates
Source: Bruegel based on International Energy Agency database (accessed March 2016) 
energy consumption of SMCs has
continuously grown over the last
few decades. Up to 2000, this
growth occurred at an even
greater pace than China. Between
2000 and 2013, the SMCs main-
tained their growth rate at a level
of about 3.4 percent, compared to
0 percent in OECD Europe.
Energy demand in SMCs will con-
tinue to grow in the future,
mainly in response to population
and GDP growth. The challenge of
rising energy demand will have
to be tackled in a sustainable
manner by SMCs, not primarily to
mitigate climate change but to
ensure macroeconomic stability.
Between 2008 and 2014 the net
energy exports of SMCs dropped
– despite similar oil prices in
both years – by more than 30
percent in US dollar terms. The
decline in net exports represents
about 3 percent of the current
GDP of SMCs. Consequently, for
SMCs simply burning more fossil
fuels does not seem to be a sus-
tainable, long-run answer. At the
same time countries including
Egypt, Algeria, Libya and
Lebanon devote about 10 per-
cent of their GDP to energy
subsidies. In 2015, energy sub-
sidies constituted a burden of
$35 billion on Egypt's public
finances, and this number could
quickly rise if oil prices increase
again. In 2013 – before oil prices
dropped by 65 percent – subsi-
dies in Egypt were $45 billion
(Coady et al, 2015). Thus, fossil
fuel subsidy schemes in several
SMCs will have to be reformed18 to
reduce wasteful energy con-
sumption and to improve fiscal
sustainability19.
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18. For a wider discus-
sion of energy
subsidies in SMCs, see
Tagliapietra (2014).
19. Energy subsidies
lead to an inefficient
allocation of resources
and market distortions
by encouraging rent-
seeking behaviour, and
thus excessive produc-
tion or consumption.
20. For an expanded
analysis of the case
study, see Tagliapietra
and Zachmann (2015).
21. For a comprehen-
sive discussion of this
issue, see Tagliapietra
and Zachmann (2016).
ENERGY ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN:  A CALL FOR REALISM
Eliminating energy subsidies will
improve the competitiveness of
renewable energy and energy
efficient solutions. This will be
crucial not only to meet the SMCs'
growing energy demand, but also
to maintain gas exports to
Europe. Egypt recently showed
how a traditional gas exporter
could suddenly turn into an
importer because of rapidly grow-
ing domestic demand. In order to
continue to supply their gas to
Europe, Algeria, Libya and Egypt
(which might again become an
exporter in the future), will have
to tap into their renewable energy
and energy efficiency potentials
(see Box 120).
Maintaining gas exports would
be beneficial for the countries
because it would ensure a stable
stream of revenues that could be
used for investment in renew-
ables and efficiency. It would
also be beneficial for the EU
because it would guarantee the
stability of imports from the
southern Mediterranean region,
which are an important element
of the EU’s gas security-of-sup-
ply architecture21.
HOW TO SUPPORT THE REGIONAL
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY
TRANSITION
Given the fragmentation of the
regional energy landscape in the
southern Mediterranean, there is
no sensible one-size-fits-all
approach for structuring coopera-
tion. Rather than the new UfM
Renewable Energy and Energy Effi-
ciency Platform, solid bilateral
partnerships between the EU and
selected countries in the region are
needed to reinvigorate the Euro-
Mediterranean energy relationship.
This also means that not all the
countries need to be engaged in
such an exercise. For instance,
BOX 1: CASE STUDY – THE DEVELOPMENT
OF RENEWABLE ENERGY IN ALGERIA
At electricity generation costs of at best €0.13 per kilowatt hour for con-
centrating solar power and around €0.07/kWh for photovoltaic, these
technologies are not competitive with existing Algerian gas turbines.
Those generate electricity from gas that could be sold to the EU market at
€2.50/kWh, which translates into a generation cost of about €0.06/kWh
(40 percent efficiency). However, renewables will become competitive
as increasing electricity demand will require additional gas turbines
(with fixed costs of about €0.005-0.01/kWh) and the cost of renewable
energy technologies is expected to decline further. Given the high share
of capital cost in the cost of renewables, the main variable for the speed
at which renewables become competitive in Algeria is the cost of capital.
This is largely a question of the regulatory framework and the business
environment. In the medium-term, the exploitation of renewable energy
resources could thus provide consistent economic benefits to Algeria. It
could free up considerable volumes of gas, currently used for domestic
electricity generation, for additional exports to Europe. Considering the
under-utilised export infrastructure, this would translate into immediate
economic returns for the country.
given their current geopolitical
situations, neither Syria nor
Libya could easily be involved.
Meanwhile, Israel is not in need
of EU support and there is limited
scope for special cooperation.
For the other seven SMCs, barri-
ers preventing the development
of renewable energy and energy
efficiency projects differ greatly,
so a tailored approach should be
adopted instead of a region-wide,
one-size-fits-all, approach.
The Energy Union Communication
proposed the establishment of
'Strategic Energy Partnerships'
(European Commission, 2015) to
enhance energy cooperation with
key producing and transit coun-
tries, and in the southern
Mediterranean this exercise is
already being carried out with
Algeria. However, such an
approach might not be effective in
SMCs, as it might be, for instance,
with Turkey, where a strategic part-
nership might allow the EU and
Turkey to use their complemen-
tary leverages in potential
gas-supplying regions and transit
countries to enable new projects
(Tagliapietra and Zachmann,
2015). In short, such clear-cut
cases seem to be less evident in
SMCs. Furthermore, this approach
entails the risk of over-politicising
the process. In practice, bringing
the top policymakers from both
sides around a table to discuss
energy cooperation might entail a
level of abstraction that is not use-
ful for the development of
concrete projects. Moreover, this
kind of approach might even jeop-
ardise the energy discussion
because of interference from other
political dossiers on the table.
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From our perspective, a better
approach to support the sustain-
able energy transition of SMCs
would be to focus the coopera-
tion on the rising financial player
in the region: the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD).
The EBRD could establish new
‘Sustainable Energy Funds’ with
selected SMCs. This mechanism
would be a public-private part-
nership (PPP) involving the bank,
the government of the selected
country, international energy
companies operating in the
country and institutional
investors willing to make a long-
term investment. The scheme
would work as follows:
The EBRD would provide•
risk-mitigation and credit-
enhancement tools to cover
the country risk faced by
international energy compa-
nies and institutional
investors. This risk might
change over time, as the
political situation in a coun-
try evolves. Reducing the
risk can enable the country
to attract more investment
because of lower interest
rates, in effect providing an
investment insurance
mechanism;
International energy compa-•
nies and institutional
investors would take on the
commercial risk, to ensure
the commercial viability of
the projects proposed;
The government of the•
selected country would con-
tribute by legally committing
to maintain stable regula-
tory conditions for the given
project. Should they fail to
do so, the banks will discon-
tinue lending – and the EU
will exercise some political
and economic leverage to
ensure repayment of exist-
ing obligations.
This PPP mechanism should be
able to provide a solid response
to the evidence that investors
might jump into the SMCs' sus-
tainable energy sector only if a
proper risk-adjusted return is
considered as guaranteed. 
Considering its experience in tran-
sition countries and reputation,
the EBRD seems to be the institu-
tion best placed to promote these
new 'Sustainable Energy Funds'.
CONCLUSIONS
After almost two decades of unpro-
ductive regional cooperation
attempts, the EU should reshape
its energy cooperation efforts in
the Mediterranean through new
bilateral approaches. In concrete
terms, we propose the establish-
ment of Sustainable Energy Funds
with selected SMCs. This would
allow support to be provided to
sustainable energy projects in
partner countries, making them
more economically stable and
safeguarding the EU’s gas security
of supply. This might also repre-
sent a significant business
opportunity for the EU energy
industry, especially in the context
of the sluggish EU energy outlook.
The authors thank Domenico
Favoino for excellent research
assistance.
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